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HE title page of Corpus Juris quotes a judicial utterance

which is being made real in the life of the law in this country in cases involving the duty of manufacturers, vendors, and
contractors to persons not in privity with them but who are
damaged as a result of defects in their products. The quotation
referred to is as follows.
"The law is progressive and expansive, adapting itself to the
new relatons and interests which are constantly springing up in
the progress of society. But this progress must be by analogy
to what is already settled.""
Hardly any field of the law is in a greater state of growth
and flux than the law of tort, and in this changing, developing
field of tort law there is perhaps no portion which has of late so
well illustrated this capacity of the common law for growth, as
the portion which deals with the topic which it is proposed to
discuss herein. Granting all that ought to be granted in favor
of the proverbial and necessary conservatism of the law there is
room for growth in the law to enable it to take the account which
in justice it ought of the demands of persons who have suffered
personal injury or other loss under the circumstances mentioned
in the- first sentence.
It seems to be rather generally understood that a court of
last resort in ruling on a question of law must be guided by sev*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota, Vermnillion, South
Dakota.
'Greene, C. J. in Hodges v. New England Screw Co., (1850) 1 R. I.
340, 356.
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eral principles of relatively equal urgency. The court must have
for its objects: first, to do justice between the parties litigant;
second, to establish rules which will work well as general rules;
third, to be so guided by the precedents of prior decisions that
persons who are likely to, or who do, become involved in similar
situations in the future may be assured with some certainty of
the legal consequences of their conduct or status. It is submitted
that, applying these postulates to the type of cases herein under
consideration, the present tendency towards extending liability,
even if carried to the logical limit hereinafter suggested, does no
violence to any of them. If, as suggested by Judge Cardozo in
the New York court of appeals, 2 "we take the liability of defendants in such cases out of the realm of contract and warranty and
put it where it belongs, in the law"-we shall still be able to
satisfy the "reasonable conservative" that the spirit at least of
stare decisis is- preserved.
The classic case with which any discussion of this topic must
begin is Whiterbottorn v. Wright,3 decided in England in the
Court of Exchequer in 1842. In this case the declaration stated
that the defendant had a contract with the postmaster-general
to supply coaches for carrying the mails over a certain route
under which he undertook to keep the coaches in a proper state
of repair for this purpose. The plaintiff was a driver in the
employ of another person who had a separate contract with the
postmaster-general to furnish horses and drivers and operate the
coach. The plaintiff further declared that he relied on the
2

McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440. The facts of this case are succinctly stated by
Judge Cardozo in the first sentences of his opinion as follows: "The defendant is a manufacturer of automobiles. It sold an automobile to a retail dealer. The retail dealer. resold to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff
was in the car it suddenly collapsed. He was thrown out and injured.
One of the wheels was made of defective wood and its spokes crumbled
into fragments. The wheel was not made by the defendant; it was bought
from another manufacturer. There is evidence, however, that its defects
could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, and the inspection
was omitted. There is no claim that the- defendant knew of the defect
and wilfully concealed it."
Judgment for the plaintiff as given in the supreme court and affirmed
by the appellate division (160 App. Div. 55, 155 N. Y. S. 462) was affirmed.
"The question to be determined," said Judge Cardozo. "is whether
the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one but the
immediate purchaser."
3(1842) 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Exch. 415.
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defendant's contract to provide a safe coach and that the defendant in fact provided a coach having certain latent defects of
which plaintiff did not know, and which broke down, causing
plaintiff to be thrown and injured.
The decision of the case was in favor of the defendant, the
court holding that the declaration was bad in substance. Although
the action was brought in the, form of an action on the case the
plaintiff relied on the contract between the defendant and the
postmaster-general and it was held that he could not recover as
the defendant under the contract owed the duty of keeping the
coach safe to the postmaster-general only and the plaintiff was
not privy to that contract. Although the case was therefore de4
cided, and doubtless correctly decided, on the pleadings, the
opinions contained language which in time came to be followed
as authority for a rule that one who is injured by a defective
chattel due to the negligence of the manufacturer, vendor, contractor, or other person supplying it, cannot recover, where the
person so injured is not in privity of contract with the one who
supplied it and who was guilty of the negligence resulting in the
injury.
Suppose that not only Winterbottom v. Wright, but all its
bastard offspring by way of exceptions are discarded, and that
the courts have adopted the rule that, where all the causal factors
are established, a manufacturer is liable to one who is injured
by his negligently prepared product.5 This surely does not vio4"The case came up on demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration, which
alleged his sole right to recover, his knowledge of and reliance upon this
contract to which he was obviously not a party. But this was overlooked
and certain dicta of Baron Alderson and Lord Abinger were seized upon
to torture the case into an authority for the doctrine that when work is
done under a contract or goods are made and sold the liability for negligence in performance or manufacture is restricted to those who are parties
to the contract or sale." F. H. Bohlen, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 633-660. This
is also pointed out by Brett, M. R. in Heaven v. Pender, (1889) L. R. 11
Q. B. D. 503, 52 L. J. Q. B. 702, 49 L. T. R. 357. See also 32 Harv. L.
Rev.5 89.
McPherson v. Buick Co., (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050. Ann.
Cas. 1916C 440; Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., (1923) 182 Wis.
94, 195 N. W. 388; Sider v. General Electric Co., (1922) 203 App. Div.
443, 197 N. Y. S. 98.
This rule might, perhaps better be stated as follows: "A manufacturer is liable to anyone who suffers a personal or property injury due
to his product while such product is being used for the purpose for which
it was intended, provided the proximate cause of the injury is a defect
or condition of the product due to the negligent or other legally wrongful conduct of the manufacturer."
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late the first postulate because it does do justice between the
parties. Baron Alderson in his opinion in Wintcibottons v.
Wright admitted that the result involved hardship for the plaintiff, but refused to let that interfere with his conception of what
reason and precedent requires. He says, "if we were to hold
that the plaintiff could sue in such a case, there is no point at
which such actions would stop." This reasoning has of course
been quoted with approval in many courts since, even in cases
which refused to stop at the beginning, as Baron Alderson evidently thought proper. 6 Even now those jurisdictions which
theoretically still adhere to the general rule of non-liability without privity of contract, because of their desire to do justice, are
still finding new exceptions to it. These exceptions are chiefly
by way of holding more and more things to be imminently dangerous to human life.7 Still other exceptions are based upon the
theory that the offending chattel, although perhaps not intrinsically dangerous to human life, nor so even because of a defect, is
nevertheless so because of the maker's prior, accompanying or
subsequent conduct.8
6Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., (1903) 120 Fed. 865, 57 C.
C. A. 237, 51 L. R. A. 303.
7Chysky v. Drake Bros., (1920) 192 App. Div. 186, 182 N. Y. S. 459
(nail imbedded in cake) ; Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., (1923) 182
Wis. 94, 195 N. W. 388 (gasoline camp stove); Pillars v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (1918) 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365.
For collections of cases in which various things are held dangerous
to life and health in this connection see the following: 4 A. L, R. 1090, 13
A. L. R. 1170, 17 A. L. R. 672, 29 Cyc. 478-486; notes 17 Harv.
L. Rev. 274 and 22 Col. L. Rev. 680. A considerable number of
cases are cited in the footnotes in 1 Bohlen. Cases on Torts 505, Cases illustrating things not treated as dangerous to life in this connection, I Bollen, 8Cases on Torts 500.
Because defendant knew of the defect: See cases cited in footnote
1 Bohlen, Cases on Torts 505; 29 Cyc. 481; Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., (1903) 120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237, 61 L. R. A. 303, and cases
cited therein.
Becau~se defendant should have known of the defect: McPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050. Ann. Cas 1916C
440; Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., (1923) 182 Wis. 94, 195
N. W. 388; Dail v. Taylor, (1909) 151 N. C. 284, 66 S. E. 135, 28 L, R. A.
(N.S.) 949; Catani v. Swift & Co., (1915) 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931; annotation, 4 A. L. R. 1090.
This is indeed the general rule as to food and drugs which are mislabeled or contain impurities or are otherwise unfit for the purpose for
which they are by their labels or their natural appearance obviously intended. Some of the cases seem almost to go beyond the conception of
due care under the circumstances in preparing and inspection of the product
prior to putting it on the market, and hold the defendant practically
liable at peril. See Catani v. Swift & Co., (1915) 251 Pa. 52, 95 At. 931,
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The second postulate can be as well applied to the one result
in these cases as to the other. The rule that defendant manufacturers shall be held liable for the injuries done by their "negligently defective products" is quite as good a general rule as the
contrary, in the sense that it is just as easily applicable. Whether
it works as well, from the standpoint of making reasonable, consistent law is of course another question. It is the purpose later
to show that the body of law which has risen upon the foundation of Winterbottom v. Wright is inconsistent with the development of conceptions of liability in certain more or less analogous
situations. 9 As already noted, much of the language in the
opinions in Winterbottom v. Wright was directed to showing
what a bad general rule it would establish to hold the defendant
liable in that case. As decided, the loss rests where it falls. The
result of holding for the plaintiff would be to shift the risk of
loss, through injuries so caused, from the individual to the manufacturer and thus, through increased cost of production, effect
its ultimate distribution upon society as consumers. A popular
modem term for this is to call it paternalistic. But the objections of Barons Alderson and Abinger and of those who fear this
sort of paternalism are founded upon conceptions acquired in an
contra to this latter proposition see 29 Cyc. 482, note 6, cases cited.
The inconsistency of excluding foods, drugs, etc, which turn out to
be dangerous because impure or mislabeled, from the operation of the
general rule of Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11
L. J. Exch. 415, is discussed by Prof. Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations
in the Law of Torts, 53 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 360, who points out that they
are not inherently dangerous but only become so when impure or mis-

labeled.
Because of fraud in deliberately concealing defects: Kculling v. Roderick Lean %ffg. Co., (1903) 88 App. Div. 309, 84 N. Y. S. 622, s. c 183

N. Y. 781, 75 N. E. 1098, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 303; Schubert %%
Clark
Co., (1892) 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. \. 1103, 32 A. S. R. 559, 15 L. R. A.
818; Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 6 L. J. Exch. 137, 2 Mees. & W. 519. See
note 24 infra, for statement of rule in this case.
Because defendant failed to warn purchaser of the potential danger
involved in the use of the article for its naturalpurpose: Sider v. General

Electric Co., (1922) 203 App. Div. 443, 197 N. Y. S. 98; see note, 36 Harv.
L. Rev. 762; Karstead v. Phil Gross Hardware Co., (1922) 178 Wis. 110,
190 N. W. 844; Henry v. Crocks, (1922) 202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. S.
642; 29 Cyc. 479. note 91.
Because plaintiff is impliedlv invited to use the article:
(a) On the defendant's premises; the leading case is Devlin v. Smith,
(1882) 89 N. Y. 470; other cases cited 29 Cyc. 486, note 14.
(b)

In general; Chysky v. Drake Bros., (1920) 192 App. Div. 186, 182

N. Y. S. 459.
9
See pages infra, also notes 20 to 25 infra.
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age less mechanical, less industrial, and less "organized" than
the one in which we are now living. The pressure of public
demand has brought much legislation intended to establish socalled paternalistic substitutes for the previously existing rules
of law. The opinions of certain members of the Supreme Court
of the United States in recent years have taught us a great deal
about the social and economic necessity of some of this kind of
paternalism. 10 It has been said that the "fellow-servant rule"
would not have come into the law in this country except for the
fact that Lemuel Shaw was born on Cape Cod in Barnstable
County and being familiar with no more complicated industrial
process than that of two men at the opposite ends of a cross-cut
saw, could see no reason why all fellow servants could not look
out for each other's careless acts." Legal, as well as scientific,
'ODissenting opinion of Taft, C. J. and Brandeis, J. in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 67 L. Ed. 785, 43 Sup. Ct. 394.
This is the famous "Minimum Wage Case" which, according to Taft,
C. J. has the effect of overruling Muller v. Oregon, (1908) 208 U. S.
412, 52 L. Ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, and rei.stablishes the doctrine of Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 49 L. Ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. 539. In
the latter case see dissenting opinion of Holmes, J. See also Bunting v.
Oregon, (1917) 243 U. S.426, 61 L. Ed. 830. 37 Sup. Ct. 139.
A case note, 1 Wis. L. Rev. 433, dealing with the precise point the
present writer is endeavoring to make, says: "The tendency of the courts
is more and more to extend the exceptions to the rule of a manufacturer's
non-liability in tort to include an ever increasing field in which recovery
may be permitted. This tendency is explained in part by the apparent injustice of adhering too strictly to the letter of these exceptions and confining them to the limited field in which they originated. The courts are no
doubt also influenced in their decisions by the fact that these rules originated at a time when industrial development had not reached the stage of
concentration of wealth in the hands of manuficturers that it has today.
By extending the liability of manufacturers there is a more equitable distribution of loss, for, instead of the individual consumer or user haying
to stand his own burdensome loss, his loss is indirectly distributed through-

out the industry."
"Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Co., (1842) 4 Mete. (Mass.)
49. "Where a master uses due diligence in the selection of competent
and trusty servants, and furnishes them with suitable means to perform
the service in which he employs them. he is not answerable to one of
them, for an injury received by him in consequence of the carelessness of
another while both are engaged in the same service." (headnote)
Here as in Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11
L. J.Exch. 415, talking about contract and ruling out the idea of tort, to
inestimable mischief as the learned reader will, it is believed, concede. At
page 60 Shaw, C. J., says, "The master is not exempt from liability, because the servant has better means of providing for his safety when lie
is employed in immediate connection with those from whose negligence he
might suffer, but because the implied contract of the master does not extend to indemnify the servant against the negligence of anyone but himself
-and he is not liable in tort because the person suffering does not stand
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economic, sociological and political concepts of the relations between men, causes, and events must inevitably change with
changing conditions. Time was, when the medical profession
considered communicable disease a visitation of providence. As
well might the court in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., have
called the defective automobile a visitation of providence in this
day, as to have denied the plaintiff recovery because of lack of
privity of contr-Act. But, said Judge Cardozo in holding the
defendant liable:
"We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life
and limb when the consequence of negligence may be foreseen,
grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source
of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source
in the law." 12
The third postulate is that the court must not be so inconsistent that men will be uncertain what legal operation their conduct may have from day to day. But that was just the situation
until the case of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., because it was
more or less uncertain from day to day what new and additional
things the courts 'would hold to be "imminently dangerous to
towards him in the relation of a stranger but is one whose rights are
regulated by contract express or implied."
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Co., (1842) 4 Metc. (Mass.)
49, was decided the same year as Winterbottom v. Wright. (1842) 10
Mees. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Exch. 415, but about three months earlier, yet
Shaw anticipated that case in the course of his opinion and suggested a
result contra to the decision in the case as it was rendered in England.
He says: "A case may be put for the purpose of Illustrating this distinction. Suppose the road had been owned by one set of proprietors whose
duty it was to keep it in repair and have it at all times ready and in fit
condition for the running of engines and cars, taking a toll, and that the
engines and cars were owned by another set of proprietors paying toll to
the proprietors of the road and receiving compensation from passengers
for their carriage, and suppose the engineer suffers a loss from the negligence of the switch tender. We are inclined to the opinion that the engiileer might have a remedy against the railroad corporation; and if so,
it must be on the ground, that as between the engineer employed by the
proprietors of the engine and cars, and the switch-tender employed by
the corporation, the engineer would be a stranger between whom and the
corporation there could be no privity of contract."
Except for the fact that the switch might be regarded as real estate
(although, despite its attachment to the soil, it is essentially mechanical
equipment) Justice Shaw has suggested a situation analogous to Winterbottom v. Wright throughout and has supposed identically the relation betAveen plaintiff and defendant which in fact existed in Winterbottom v.
Wright, he suggests that recovery should be permitted and for precisely
the reason given by the Judges in the Exchequer for denying the plaintiff's 2rieht to recover.
' McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,(1916) 217 N. Y. 382. 111 N. E.
1050. Ann. Cas. 1916C 440. See note 29 Harv. L. Rev. 866.
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human life." In his recently published "The Growth of the
Law" 13 Judge Cardozo, without entirely answering himself asks
this question: "What however was the posture of affairs before
the Buick Case had been determined? Was there any law on the
subject ?"

Now have not most courts recognized, at least since 1883,
that :
"Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a
position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense
who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those
circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or
property of another, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill
to avoid such danger?" 14
Even before this definition of negligence in Heaven v. Pender, the courts had begun to lay down exceptions to Winicrbottom v. Wright and in spite of the perseverance of the general rule
of non-liability the bar has not been discouraged. Exception after
exception has become as well recognized as the general rule and
some of the more recent cases seem to forecast that day when
the old xile will be abandoned altogether. This final step can
hardly be greater than some of those which have already been
taken.
Departures from this rule have been regarded as exceptions
and at first these exceptions were strictly confined to cases involving the essential facts upon which such exceptions were based.
It is only in some of the comparatively recent cases,1" and in the
13Cardozo, Growth of the Law, being a series of lectures delivered by
Judge4 Cardozo at the Yale Law School in 1923.
1 Heaven v. Pender, (1889) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503, 52 L. J. Q. B. 702,
49 L.5 T. R. (N.S.) 357.
1 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440: Skinn v. Reuter, (1903) 135 Mich. 57, 97
N. W. 152, 106 A. S. R. 384, 63 L. R. A. 743; Sider v. General Electric
Co., (1922) 203 App. Div. 443, 197 N. Y. S. 98; Henry v. Crooks, (1922)
202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. S. 642; Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove
Co, (1923) 182 Wis. 94, 195 N. W. 388; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co.,
(1915) 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N. Y. S. 131; Pillars v. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., (1918) 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365; Karsteadt v. Phil Gross Hardware
Co., (1922) 179 Wis. 110, 190 N. W. 844; Wright v. Howe, (1915) 46 Utah
588, 150 Pac. 956, L. R. A. 1916B 1104; Parks v. Yost Pie Co., (1914) 93
Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202; Mazetti v. Armour & Co., (1913) 75 Wash. 622, 135
Pac. 633; Murphy v. Sioux Falls Serum Co., (1921) 44 S. D. 421, 184
N. W. 252; Heaven v. Pender, (1889) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503, 52 L. J. Q. B.
702, 49 L. T. R. (N.S.) 357, may be regarded as forecasting this principle of liability. Glimmerings of it also appear in a few other cases prior
to McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
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suggestions of legal writers and reviewers 0 that one finds the
frank recognition that the true test of liability for a "negligently
defective product" to the user thereof rests directly upon the
broad theory of "omission of due care under the circumstances."
The reason for the tardy recognition of this truth is without
doubt to be accounted for in the historically late development of
the idea of negligence and the very recent full appreciation of its
"reach and power.' 7
That Winterbottont v. Wright, as it has been interpreted,
represents a hiatus in the smooth and logical development of the
idea of negligence as a basis of tort liability, is brought out by
Professor F. H. Bohlen in his article on "Landlord ahd Tenant.'"
Professor Bohlen is dealing with the liability of a landlord for
negligently making repairs in such a manner that the tenant or
someone using the premises in his right is injured. He maintains
that the result in Gill v. Middleton,19 involving this situation, was
correct, and points out that the liability which the court imposes
1050, Ann. Gas. 1916C 440, for example Schubert v. Clark, (1892) 49
Minn. 331, 51 N. W. 1103, 32 A. S. R. 559, 15 L. R. A. 818; Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., (1913) 75 Wash. 6-2, 135 Pac. 633; Wright v. Howe,
(1915) 46 Utah 588, 150 Pac. 956, L. R. A. 1916B 1104; and Skinn v.
Reuter, (1903) 135 Mich. 57, 97 N. W. 152, 63 L. R. A. 743, 106 A. S. R.
384; are not decided directly on the negligence basis but are to be regarded
by reason of the dicta they contain as indicating the gathering consciousness
of a new rule of reason in dealing with these cases.
26 Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L Rev. 40-53. "A person who delivers
a thing to another or furnishes a thing for another's .use, comes under
duties to use due care either not to deliver or furnish a thing which is unreasonably dangerous at all, or, if the thing is dangerous but it is not
wrong to deliver or furnish it, to take precautions, if reasonableness requires that, against the danger."
The above quotation from the article cited deals with the second of
Mr. Terry's five classifications of affirmative duties independent of contract and the violation of which are stated by the author to give rise to
rights of action based upon negligence. This article defines negligence as
conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage.
See also articles by Prof. Bohlen, viz., The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts. 53 U. of Pa. L. R. 209; Landlord and Tenant, 35 Harv; L, Rev. 633.
The following are a few of the many law review notes which have
been consulted:
2 Col. L. Rev. 105; 22 Col. L. Rev. 764; 22 Mich. L. Rev. 497; 70 Pa.
L. Rev. 135; 17 Harv. L. Rev. 274; 15 Harv. L. Rev. 166; 19 Harv. L.
Rev. 372; 32 Harv. L. Rev. 89. A most excellent and important note on this
point, 30 Yale L. J. 607.
Other such notes are cited in various footnotes.
17Thayer E. R., Liability Without Fault, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 801.
1835 Harv. L. Rev. 633.
19(1870) 105 Mass. 477.
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in that case (the undertaking being gratuitous) was essentially a
tort liability. Bohlen says in this connection:
"The liability now under discussion is at least on the surface
closely analogous to two liabilities enforced by actions of tort
which are either universally or generally limited to those with
whom the defendant directly deals: (1) the liability for misrepresentation as enforced in the action of deceit, and (2) the liability of a manufacturer of a dangerously defective product."
The analogy between deceit and the liability of the landlord
as discussed by Professor Bohlen is essentially similar to that
between the deceitful representation and the act oi the manufacturer who puts out a defective product. He says: "It is submitted that the principles of the action of deceit should not be
extended beyond its own particular field," 20 and again two pages
farther on, "Since warranties did not run with the goods bought
in reliance on them, it was almost inevitable that it should be
held that the right to recover upon a fraudulent misstatement did
not pass to one who succeeds to rights acquired in reliance
,thereon," and on the same page this: "So too the limitation of
liability in deceit to those to whom the statement is made and
whom the maker intends to act upon it, followed almost inevit' 21
ably from the close analogy of deceit to actions on warranties.
2035 Harv. L. Rev. 654.
2

lAs to this analogy to warranty see also Prof. Williston's article oil
Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415 in which he
says: "It is common enough in our law to find that sevvral parts of it
which have grown up with little regard to each other, have, nevertheless,
logical intimate connection and the doctrines laid down in one set of
cases are hardly reconcilable with those established in others."
If we wish to trace these analogous doctrines back far enough in the
search for a common source, we may perhaps find the first error in tile
early history of assumpsit. The horse doctor was liable on his undertaking because of the public nature of his calling and although his customer
has no covenant upon which to base an action he can bring an action of
"case" and is permitted thus to recover in an action which sounds in tort.
Horse Doctor's Case. (1440) 19 Hen. 1V 49, 5. But if a carpenter fail
entirely to erect a building as per his promise there is no remedy because
an assumpsit cannot be shown, his calling (unlike the horse doctor's) not
being of a public nature.
"From very early times, prior to the development of assumpsit, a vendor was not liable to the vendee for any defect of title or quality in the
chattel sold unless he had either given an express warranty or was under
a public duty from the nature of his calling to sell articles of a certain
quality. Stuart v. Wilkins, (1778) 3 Doug. 18, is said to have been the
first instance of an assumpsit upon a vendor's warranty." Ames, History of
Assumpsit, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1-8. In short privity of contract was by the
time of the case cited by Ames, sufficient to raise an implied warranty.
The present transition to a recognition of the tort nature of vendors'
and manufacturers' liability for defective products is a logical sequence
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Where the plaintiff is allowed recovery in actions involving the rule
drawn from Winterbottom v. Wright the result is usually reached
by referring the case to one of the exceptions, although there are
cases which allow the plaintiff to recover by saying that he, as a
user of the article, was within the contemplation of the defendant
when he sold the thing.2 2 Some of these later cases have apparently treated the plaintiff's right as resting on a sort of implied
warranty.2 3 So many are the cases which say the plaintiff was
"impliedly invited" by the defendant to use the article, because
of the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the plaintiff,
either as an individual or even as merely one of a class for whose
use the article was intended, that they may perhaps be regarded
as one of the established exceptions to Winterbottoin. v. Wright."
Indeed where the dangerous thing is to be used on the defendant's
real-estate and was made or put there by the defendant for that
use, there is a very respectable body of authority which seems to
hold this circumstance enough to take the case quite outside the
scope of the Winterbottom v. Wright rule.2 5 In this situation we
and that contention finds historical justification in the fact that the duty
where privity of contract does exist, was first enforced in the absence of
an express proniise, through a tort action of trespass on the case, (although
t6 be2 2sure limited to cases of public callings).
Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 2 Mees. & W. 519.
23
See Chysky v. Drake Bros., (192-0) 192 App. Div. 186, 182 N. Y. S
459. An action by a plaintiff whose mouth was injured by a wire nail
concealed in a piece of cake made by defendants. The plaintiff did not
buy it directly from defendants, however. The court held that the implied
warranty to the retailer inured to the plaintiff who can recover either for
breach of warranty or for negligence. The case is discussed in a note, 20
Col. L. Rev. 924, which points out that no negligence was alleged or proved,
thus making the result depend upon the wvarranty "running" to the subsequent retail vendee--a result contra to the great majority, if not all of
the cases discussing this point.
24
Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 2 Mees. & W. 519. was argued by the
plaintiff's counsel in Winterbottom v. Wright as calling for the application of the idea of running warranty but Baron Alderson distinguished it,
saying that Langridge v. Levy turned on the question of fraud in the defendant in deliberately making a false statement with the intent of having
it acted on and the plaintiff being the person who from his knowledge
must have been foreseen or foreseeable to him as the party likely to be damaged.2 5
This is the second of the exceptions as stated in Huset v. Case
Threshing Mach. Co., (1903) 120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237, 51 L. R. A.
303. This doctrine will serve as a basis for some cases not otherwise
explainable in jurisdictions recognizing Winterbottom v. Wright as laying
down the general rule. For example, Heaven v. Pender could be explained on this ground as possible in the same jurisdiction with Winterbottom v. Wright, although as pointed out the language of the court in
Heaven v. Pender is much broader. See note 26 infra. In this connection
see also Devlin v. Smith, (1882) 89 N. Y. 470; Conners v. Great North-
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are of course approaching very close to Gill v. Middleton, or the
plaintiff may in such case be regarded as an ihvitee on realestate, which of course puts the case in quite a different category
so far as both authority for and theory of allowing recovery aro
2

concerned. G

The most frequently quoted summary of the Winterbottom
v. Wright exceptions is probably that found in Huset v. Case
Threshing Machine Co.2 7 In this case Sanborn, J. stated the
general rule and following exceptions:
"The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer or
vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of
mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of
an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life 23is
actionable by third persons who suffer from the negligence.
ern Elevator Co., (1904) 90 App. Div. 311, 85 N. Y. S. 644; Elliott v. Hall,
(1885) L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 315, 54 L. J. Q. B. 5-8; Swan v. Jackson,
(1889) 55 Hun 194, 7 N. Y. S. 821; Hayes v. Philadelphia, etc., Coal Co.,
150 Mass. 457, 23 N. E. 225.
(1890)
2
6See language of Brett, M. R. in Heaven v. Pender which would
seem to put the liability of the owner of real estate on the basis of pure
negligence. The writer of a note 2 Col. L. Rev. 105 after discussing
Schubert v. Clark Co., (1892) 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W. 1103, 32 A. S. R.
559, 15 L. R. A. 818; George v. Skivington, (1869) L. R. 5 Ex. 1 (the
hair restorer case) and Teal v. American Mining Co., (1901) 84 Minn. 320,
87 N. W. 837, says by way of pointing out that these cases can hardly be
reconciled with the exceptions to the rule of the Winterbottom Case:
"But it can hardly be said that a defective stepladder is more dangerous
to human life than was the defective stage-coach in Winterbottom v.
Wright." This note expresses the view that the above cases must be put
upon the theory of Brett, M. R. in Heaven v. Pender, (1889) L. R. 11
Q. B. D. 503, 52 L. J. Q. B. 702, 49 L. T. R. (N.S.) 357, where he says,
"Where in omitting to perform a contract, in whole or in part, one also
omits to use ordinary care to avoid injury to third persons, who, as he
could with a slight degree of care foresee, would be exposed to risk by
his negligence, he should be liable to such persons for injuries which
are the proximate result of such negligence.
Notwithstanding the language used in Heaven v. Pender, it cannot
be said that the English courts have abandoned the views expressed in
Winterbottom v. Wright for the broader test of "care according to the
circumstances." In Earl v. Lubbock, [1905] 1 K. B. 253, 1 Ann. Cas. 753,
the court of appeal approved the general rule laid down in the Winterbottom Case declaring that the decision in that.case has since 1842 stood the
test of repeated discussion. The principles stated by Lord Abinger were
referred to and approved as being based on sound reasoning.
For a general survey of the course of English decisions on this question see the opinion in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., (1916) 217 N. Y.
382, 111 N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440.
27(1903)
120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237, 51 L. R. A. 303.
2
8This statement of the exception so well recognized does not bring
out fully the distinction which has been taken between things imminently
dangerous because inherently so. viz., intrinsically, in their natural state
and those which become so by reason of their defects. This distinction
has become important in some jurisdictions at least. See notes 30 and 31
and accompanying text.
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The second exception is that an owner's act of negligence which
causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective
appliance, upon the owner's premises may form the basis of an
action against the owner. The third exception to the rule is that
one who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be iiminently dangerous to life or limb to another without notice of its
qualities is liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom
which might have been reasonably anticipated whether there were
any contractual relations between the parties or not."
This then is the chart by which the courts have endeavored
to steer in determining the limits of manufacturers' and vendors'

liability for "negligently defective products."

With only these

three fixed points, the field was mapped on too large a scale and
it has inevitably resulted that there is much confusion in the cases.
Rather naturally not all jurisdictions have agreed as to what is
Foods, drugs, weapons, and explosives
imminently dangerous.2
are pretty generally conceded to fall in this class and machinery
has more recently been regarded as at least potentially so. New
York reports are especially prolific in cases bearing upon this
problem. In the earlier New York cases machinery was regarded
as not imiinently dangerous, because not inherently so,"0 but this
rule was later abandoned in New York 3' as well as in many other
29"So numerous are the exceptions to the general rule in favor of
foods, drugs and articles imminently dangerous to human life and so numerous and varied are the opinions as to what is imminently dangerous,
that the exceptions might be said to be the rule." 32 Harv. L. Rev. 89,
note to Pillars v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (1918) 117 Miss. 490. 78 So. 365.
holding manufacturer liable to consumer who contracted ptomaine poisoning from foreign substance in chewing tobacco. See also 29 Harv. L. Rev.
866, note on McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., commenting on the extent
to which the exception had been carried in New York prior to the Buick
Case.
3DKuelling v. Roderick Lean Co., (1904) 88 App. Div. 309. 84 N. Y. S.
622, 3the land roller case.
lKahner v. Otis Elevator Co., (1904) 96 App. Div. 169, 89 N. Y. S.
185. The court said in this case: "This is undoubtedly an extension of
the rule but it has its support in authority," citing Devlin v. Smith, (1882)
89 N. Y. 480.
To the same effect are later New York cases including Statler v. Ray,
(1908) 125 App. Div. 69, 109 N. Y. S. 172, affirmed on this point 195 N. Y.
478, 88 N. E. 1063. In this case a steam coffee urn exploded injuring the
plaintiff who was president of the hotel company which had purchased
it. The hotel company had purchased it of a jobber and not directly from
the manufacturer. The court of appeals said: "This leaves on this branch
of the case simply the question whether a manufacturer and vendor of
such an inherently dangerous appliance as this may be made liable to a
third party-on the theory of the plaintiff (viz.. that the defendant, knowing
the use for which it was intended, was chargeable with knowledge of the
defective and unsafe condition) and we think that this question must be
regarded as settled in the plaintiff's favor."
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states and it came to be admitted that "although the thing is not
inherently dangerous, if the defendant's negligence makes it dangerous, that is enough to fix liability upon him." 32
Of course where the defendant knows of the dangerously
defective nature of his product, as in Langridge v. Levy,
referred to on page 22, and sells it in that condition, the
important question is not whether the danger is one inhering in
the product in its natural state or merely arising out of the defect,
but, rather, whether the defendant informed the purchaser of
this condition of the product. One may sell defective products
to a purchaser who buys with full knowledge, but where the
manufacturer or vendor who puts out the product conceals this
fact the user who is injured in consequence, even though he be
not in privity, will be permitted to recover. Some of the cases
show an inclination to assimilate this situation to deceit. Whether
the court does this or merely treats the case as an exception to
Winterbottom v. Wright is immaterial as far as the plaintiff's
right to recover is concerned. At any rate the rule is well established in favor of the plaintiff in such cases.33
Likewise, Torgeson v. Schultz, (1908) 192 N. Y. 156, 84 N. E. 956.

Plaintiff having no contract relation with defendant was permitted to
recover for injury caused by the bursting of a siphon bottle filled and
sold by defendant.
32
A case note 17 Harv. L. Rev. 274 on the case of Skinn v. Renter,
(1903) 135 Mich. 57, 97 N. W. 152, 63 L. R. A. 743, 106 A. S. R. 384
says: "As the law is, the only question open is, 'what articles are dangerous to life?'" The note quoted was prepared at that stage in the development of the New York Law represented by Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Co.,
(1904) 88 App. Div. 309. 84 N. Y. S. 622. The New York rule at that
time fixed as the test of what was imminently dangerous, the nature of
the article in its ordinary state, and the Michigan case noted determined
the imminently dangerous character of the offending article by reference
to its defective state. As already stated New York adopted this broader
test in Kahner v. Otis Elevator Co. (1904) 96 App. Div. 169, 89 N. Y. S.
185, and has reiterated it in the Buick Case and other more recent decisions.
It is further suggested in the case note referred to that the Michigan
test, viz., the nature of the article in its defective state is the better one
for the following reasons: First. because it is more accurate; the seller
is held liable because his negligence endangers the public and this depends
on what the article actually is, not. on what it would be if perfect: second,
it is more convenient. It greatly reduces the difficulty of deciding what
articles are dangerous; third, it is more just, because it tends to broaden
the scope of the existing rule which in any event is too narrowly construed.
33
This was really the basis of the Skinn v. Renter case cited in note
32. Recent cases taking this position include: Thornhill v. CarpenterMorton Co., (1915) 220 Mass. 593. 108 N. E. 474; Henry v. Crooks, (1922)
202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. S. 642; Sider v. General Electric Co., (1922)
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Today, not only have legal authors, unhampered by precedent, put aside all exceptions as the test of liability in cases of
the sort under consideration, but cases have been decided and
opinions written, at least a few of them, saying that a manufacturer whose negligence is responsible for a defective product
shall be liable to a consumer or user injured in consequence, not
because of a more or less arbitrary test.of the thing's dangerousness to life bringing it within an exception to an odious rule, but
because he was negligent in the performance of a duty imposed
by the law.
The purpose of this article .may be served by some reference
to another phase of negligence or what at any rate might perhaps
more properly be so treated than in the anomalous way it has
been treated. The posthumous article by the late Dean E. R.
Thayer of the Harvard Law School, entitled "Liability Without
Fault," 34 suggests an analogy of the present inquiry to another
aspect of the law of tort in which the fundamental principle of
negligence law is being gradually applied to the working out of a
more symmetrical pattern of duties and liabilities. Dean Thayer
says:
"That law (negligence) is very modernm-so modern that
even the great judges who sat in Rylands v. Fletcher" can have
had but an imperfect sense of its reach and power."
This article proceeds to point out that the emphasis of the modern
law of negligence is more and more upon the conception of due
care according to the circumstances,a doctrine which has had high
judicial sanction in clear and lucid English, at least since Heaven
v. Pender; "and," Thayer adds, "if the theory of negligence is
sufficient to carry the case to the jury, the plaintiff's remaining
difficulties-again looking at the matter in its practical aspectare not likely to be serious."
The situation involved in Rylands v. Flctcher is not so different from that involved in the relation between manufacturers
and the ultimate users of their "negligently defective products"
as might at first appear to be the case. Nor is the gap in their
203 App. Div. 443, 197 N. Y. S. 98. See note 40 infra, quoting opinion in
this case.
Older cases on this point. 29 Cyc. 482 note 6, show especially the
negative application of this rule.
3429 Harv. L. Rev. 801.

35(1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
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legal effect so great as the language of the opinions in Rylands v.
Fletcher on the one hand and Winterbottom v. Wright on the
other, would suggest. In a sense we have in these two decisions
the opposite poles of law: absolute liability in the one and no liability in the other. These propositions are laid down as rules of
law on the basis of facts so similar that both could be left to a
jury on substantially the same instructions with a very reasonable probability of substantial justice being done. Indeed it
seems not absurd to suppose that, if these two cases had not
arisen, until the present time, and the general field of negligence
had developed in other directions as it has, these cases perhaps
would have been left to the jury with such instructions as to
proximate cause as are customarily given in the particular jurisdiction. The reader is heartily referred to the above-mentioned
article by Dean Thayer for a convincing presentation of the allaround practicableness of applying a broad conception of negligence with a goodly range of jury discretion in dealing with cases
of this sort.
Looking at the two cases in this frame of mind, Winterbottom v. Wright and Rylands v. Fletcher are readily comparable.
Rylands v. Fletcher is the case of a defendant who lets something
dangerous escape from his land. Without considering the question whether he knew, or at least ought to have known of the
defective bottom of his reservoir, he is held liable at peril to persons damaged by the operation of that dangerous thing after it
has left his land and his control. Why is this so? just because
the thing was dangerous? Because, simply by reason of the fact
that he had it, he is just as culpable as if negligent, or perhaps
more so, because it was a potentially dangerous thing. He may
have known that it was dangerous under the circumstances, and
he may not have known this. In Rylands v. Fletcher, as the decision is written, there is the suggestion of negligence on the defendant's part in not knowing this, but upon the theory of the decision this is immaterial and he is liable although he may not have
known of the danger until after the damage was done. As Thayer
points out, the law of negligence had not been developed to the
point where the juidges could see a basis for its application.
Does negligence consist in failure to know whether the dangerous force is safely confined or not? Is it not common knowledge that, if not safely confined, a large body of water is a dan-
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gerous force? Why does not due care under the circumstances,
(viz., the circumstance of having collected a large body of water)
demand that the defendant shall know (not think) that all reasonable precautions (and only reasonable ones) have been taken
to assure that it is safely confined? If this is correct, then in
Rytands z. Fletcher, there was evidence to go to the jury on the
issue of negligence, viz., there was evidence tending to indicate
that the defendant had not fully performed his duty of due care.
But the court not recognizing that duty (of knowing whether
the force was safely confined) and feeling that here was nevertheless a sort of culpability, in having gathered up all this water
so that it amounted to a dangerous force, the defendant was
treated as having done something for which he must be liable at
peril. In short the court, not finding a satisfactory basis for
charging the defendant with fault held him liable without fault.
In the cases following the general rule of Winterbottomn v.
Wright we have a defendant who has not let, but who has put
out of his control something dangerous. Not by its escape, but
by his contractual act this defendant has surrendered his control
of the force or thing in question. As was also the case in
Rylands v. Fletcher someone is damaged. In both cases the person injured is not contractually a party to the act by which the
defendant loses control of the force or thing. In this latter class
of cases the defendant is held not liable and in the last analysis
for the very reason which lead the judges in Fletcher v. Rylands
to invent the absolute liability rule in that case, namely, because
a duty to use due care was not recognized in the premises of the
case. It is submitted that the duty in both cases is the same,
namely that of knowing that the thing or force is safe, in the
sense of being free from defects which would make it dangerous
and which due care on the part of the defendant could have prevented.
Rylands v. Fletcher was too severe on the defendant and
could not be applied without violating the first of the three postulates referred to in the opening paragraphs of this.paper. Hence,
by exceptions and by limitations its doctrine has been cut down
to an extent which will permit its application in harmony with

the first postulate and at the same time without doing too great
violence to postulates two and three.
On the other hand, Winterbottont v. Wright founded a rule
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of law too lenient with defendants and so a doctrine of liability
has been built up piecemeal by exceptions in order to do the inanifest justice which a strict adherence to the language used in the
opinions in Winterbottom v. Wright made impossible.
Reference has already been made to the distinction which has
been drawn between things imminently dangerous (i. e., inherently, in their natural state) and -those which are so only because
defective. It is of course around this latter group that most of
the more recent legal battles have been waged. These are the
struggles out of which has come our more modern rule as stated
in the New York case of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.30
Certain things have by the sheer weight of numbers of decisions become recognized as inherently dangerous. The defendant's duty here is to be sure that both the vendee and subsequent
users are given notice or the means of knowledge of the dangerous character of the thing. 37 Some other things are perfectly
safe if they are pure and are what they purport to be (viz., not
mislabelled) yet are treated as being of a class so susceptible to
dangerous qualities affecting life and health that manufacturers
are practically at peril to avoid these dangerous qualities. Foods,
drugs, beverages, and other things to be similarly used, such as
chewing gum and tobacco, are regarded as potentially so hni1i-

nently dangerous that many cases apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur as against makers or dealers where such products prove to be
impure and thereby cause injury to the person. That is to say,
the user who is injured by unwholesome food preparations, mislabelled drugs, or impure beverages is required only to prove the
fact of his injury and its causal connection with the product. It
is then incumbent upon the maker or dealer to negative any negli38
gence on his part in preparation or inspection if he can.
3G(1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440.
3T
Note 33 supra.
38Res ipsa loquitur is probably not consciously applied in many of the
cases but see Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., (1912) 10 Ga. App.
762, 73 S. E. 1087.
The most recent case involving this concept is probably De Groat v.
Ward Baking Co., (N.J. 1925) 130 Atl. 540. in which it was held that presence of part of a broken electric light bulb imbedded in a loaf of bread
justifies a finding of negligence. The question was, however, left to the
Jury in that case. Ouaere whether a directed verdict for plaintiff on
the ground of negligence would not have been affirmed.
It is suggested that this doctrine has nerhaps unconsciously influenced
many of the decisions involving impurities in foods, drugs, and other
things intended for human consumption.
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As to things not inherently dangerous but so- only because
of their defective condition, the earlier rule, if we omit the cases
involving foods, drugs and the like, was that the defendant must
know of the defect. The newer tendency however is to hold that
liability may be based on the knowledge that the thing, if defective, will be dangerous. This of course .is so in such cases as
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., and other recent cases which
really put the liability on the ground of negligence without reference t6 the old rule and its exceptions. In short there is a duty,
when the thing is dangerous or, if defective, likely to be so, to
know that it is not defective, and it is the negligence in not performing this duty which is made the basis of liability.
This classification is subject of further subdivision as between those cases where the defect is patent and those where it
is latent.39 The tendency of recent cases is to hold that the defendant must know of patent defects in articles which, while they
are not intrinsically dangerous, are rendered so by these patent
defects. To say that the manufacturer must know of latent
defects would be practically equivalent to holding him liable at
peril for all defects whether there was negligence or not. He is
not treated as an insurer. However there is an intermediate
situation to be considered. Can a manufacturer who has purchased materials or parts going into his completed product, escape
39"Patent" is here used in a sense which is perhaps incorrect. What
is meant is that a patent defect is one which could be discovered by due
care in the way of inspection during the process of manufacture and
assembling of an article. A latent defect in this sense is one not thus
discoverable. For example, see Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., (1924)
203 Ky. 408, 262 S. IV. 583. A porch-swing hook broke after seven
months' use apparently because of crystallization of the metal. There wvas
evidence tending at least to show that this was due to excessive vibration
which would not have occurred if it had been screwed all the way into
the supporting wood. In any event, if the crystallization did exist when
the retailer sold the article it was not susceptible to discovery by inspection. Held. no liability without privity of contract.
This distinction is also spoken of in some cases in another connection.
Where a maker sells a completed product having a defect not patent
upon reasonable inspection he is liable to one who may come in contact
with the article and suffer injury in consequence of its use in the ordinary
way in which it was intended to be used. "Patent" as used in this sense
of course means, discoverable in the course of such inspection-as the article can and will reasonably be subjected to by the purchaser in its completed, "ready to use," condition. A latent thing in this sense, viz, not
discoverable by such inspection as the buyer could give it. might be patent in determining the duty of the manufacturer who has the parts of this
completed thing before they are put together and to whom they are
reasonably discoverable at that stage.
See note 45 infra.
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liability on the ground that he has used due care in that he
has purchased such parts from a reputable manufacturer thereof ?
In this connection we may fairly say: if the manufacturer is
liable for injuries due to patent defects, then it is his duty to
make a reasonably careful inspection of the product and of the
things he puts into it, in order that he may discover such defects
as are discoverable (patent). Having this responsibility, can a
manufacturer, by purchasing parts from other manufacturers
and assembling them into his completed product, delegate his
responsibility to an independent contractor in the form of a parts
maker or material man? In McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
Judge Cardozo plainly says he cannot. Later decisions in New
York affirm, if indeed they do not go farther in fixing the responsibility of inspection inalienably upon the manufacturer of the
completed product.40 On the other hand it has been properly
pointed out in a recent case involving impurities in tobacco that
this responsibility, while it does rest on the maker, is not shared
by the distributor.

41

In the proposition of the Buick Case, it seems to the writer
we find the common objective point of the trails of the law,
the one leading from Rylands v. Fletcher, in which by a precipitous leap the correct result was probably reached on the facts,
the other, originating in the case of Winterbottom v. Wright and
by a devious and winding way of exceptions, approaches the same
legal proposition but finally reaches it only, when, as in McPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., the old rule and its reasoning were both cast
aside and the new reasoning adopted as the entire basis of the decision. Furthermore, this case establishes a rule consistent with
42
Gill v. Middleton.
Two points remain in which the law is yet unsettled or unfinished by the strict authority of the Buick Case.
First: To whom does this duty on the part of a nianufacturer or vendor extend? Second: For what kind of damage
40

Sider v. General Electric Co.. (1922) 203 App. Div. 443, 197 N. Y. S.
98, it is said by Hubbs J: "It would be strange if a defendant could place
in a completed machine to be used in an extremely hazardous business,
an unusual foreign substance which would have the effect of making the
machine an engine of destruction and fail to give the purchaser notice or
warning of the presence of such foreign substance and then escape liability
upon the ground that the purchaser was also liable for negligence, because
it failed to inspect and remove the foreign substance."
41Pillars v. Reynolds Tobacco Co.. (1918) 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365.
42(1870) 105 Mass. 477. See note 19.
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may recovery be had? If a jurisdiction has abandoned the whole
idea of privity as affecting liability in such cases and put it on
the basis of negligence, does the remoteness of the connection
between the defendant and the party injured make any difference
so long as the plaintiff can trace his injury to the defendant's
negligence, and does it make any difference if the damage the
plaintiff is seeking to recover for is not personal injury but property damage?
The following illustrations will perhaps serve to bring out
the various phases of these problems, both as to parties entitled
to recover and as to the nature of the damage or injury compensable on this theory:
1. (a) May a plaintiff whose person is injured by a defective chattel which he himself owns, recover from the manufacturer?
The answer here is yes. This is the point covered by the
Buick Case.
(b) May a plaintiff whose property is injured by a defective
article which he himself owns, recover from the manufacturer?
Unless there is some reason for distinguishing between personal and property damage in the application of this rule, the
answer here also would be yes. We are dealing with the same
duty and the same defect but a different damage. Suppose, to
follow as closely as possible the analogy of the facts in the Buick
Case, that the owner of the car was transporting his valuable
and fragile china when the wheel collapsed. A New York case
would permit him to recover. 43 It should be noted that we are
still thinking of a thing which if defective will be dangerous to
life, and the duty is that recognized in the Buick Case to use this
high degree of care and to perform it towards persons subsequently affected by the product because danger to human life is
involved. A later consideration will be, the nature of the duty
when the defective thing is, because defective, dangerous to property only.
2. (a) May a plaintiff whose person is injured by a defective chattel, omed by another but in use by him as licensee or
invitee of the owner, recover? Example: Plaintiff is using an
automobile loaned to him by the owner when the wheel collapses
as in the Buick Case.
43

Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., (1915)

N. Y. S. 131.

167 App. Div. 433, 153
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Here again it is submitted that he should be pernlitted to recover
from the manufacturer and such seems to be the result in a re44
cent Wisconsin case.
(b) May the plaintiff whose property is injured by a defective chattel being used by him under the right of the owner,
recover from the maker? Example: Plaintiff has borrowed the
automobile and his property which he is transporting in it is
smashed by the collapse of the wheel.
,\gain the answer should be yes if the thing is dangerous to human
life on account of its defective condition, although no case precisely in point under this classification has come to the writer's
attention.
3. (a) May a plaintiff whose person is injured by a chattel
belonging to and in use by a stranger, recover from the manufacturer? In this case the party plaintiff has no connection with the
defective chattel whatever but is injured in consequence of the
defect merely because he happens to be in its presence when the
defect "erupts."
Example: The plaintiff is passing nearby when the automobile wheel collapses and this causes it to swerve and strike the
plaintiff."
It is perhaps not as easy to answer this case in the affirinative because we are at least approaching the debatable ground of
whether the defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. Perhaps in some jurisdictions this would be
regarded as too remote. While it is not the purpose of this paper
to become in any way involved in the problem of proximate cause
it is the writer's feeling that the above facts are at least sufficient
to take the question of causal relation to the jury. If proximate
cause is established in a case of this class, the answer here also
44Coakley v. Prentiss Wabers Stove Co., (1923) 182 Wis. 94, 195
N. W. 388, a gasoline camp stove exploded while being operated by the
mother-in-law of the purchaser and injured her.
4"Hutchins v. Maunder, (1920) 37 T. L. R. 72. Defendant bought a
twelve year old car. His servant inspected it and started driving it
home. There was a latent defect in the steering gear. The car swerved
and plaintiff was injured. There was a fact-finding of no negligence on
the part of defendant's servant in inspecting or driving the car. Ifeld
plaintiff can recover. See note on this case 34 Harv. L. Rev. 564 in which
it is said that while the case attempts to distinguish between "defective"
and "sound" cars it does in effect extend absolute liability to all accidents
in the nature of internal breaking occurring during the operation of the
car. This case does not involve the liability of manufacturers as vendors but is cited chiefly because of its extension of liability to a case
where the defendant could not discover the defect by any reasonable inspection. It goes beyond the field of negligence however, and imposes
liability at peril as per Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) L. R. I Ex. 265.
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should be "yes." Two New York cases may be mentioned in
this connection; although in both cases the plaintiff's connection
was closer than that of the mere passer by, he was not actually
using the thing. In Sider v. General Electric Co.," he was present in the .electric tower in his capacity as an employee of the
company owning the transformer when the current was turned
on and the short circuit occurred. In this case the decedent's
representative was permitted to recover from the maker of the
apparatus. In Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 47 the plaintiff was the
president of the corporation owning the defective steam coffee
urn and was standing by as a spectator when it exploded and
injured him. In this case the court said the manufacturer would
be liable to any one in the presence of the apparatus.
3. (b) May a plaintiff whose property is injured by a defective chattel, belonging to and used by a stranger and behaving in
such manner and place as to damage the plaintiff's property,
recover therefor from the manufacturer?
Example: The collapsing automobile wheel throws the car
against and it damages the plaintiff's car which is lawfully parked
nearby. Or perhaps the wheel comes off and rolls through the
front window of one plaintiff's building breaking glass and other
fixtures and injures the goods displayed in the window by a
second plaintiff who is the tenant of the premises.
Here again, the cause not being too remote, it is believed that the
damage to this property is a proper item of recovery against the
manufacturer.
Thus far we have been thinking of the above suggested situations as arising in connection with a "negligently defective
product" which in that condition may endanger hunfan life or
health. What about a chattel defective in such a way as to be
capable of endangering property or other economic interests but
not the person? There are many cases denying recovery for
property damages occasioied by defective chattels to persons not
in privity with the defendant. In some of these cases it has been
stated that this is because the thing causing the damage was not
"imminently dangerous to human life and health." There are
two recent Mfassachusetts cases involving this point. 48 Massachusetts has consistently denied liability of manufacturers, ven46(1922) 203 App. Div. 443, 197 N. Y. S. 98.
47(1908) 125 App. Div. 69, 109 N. Y. S. 172.

4sWindram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., (1921) 239 Mass. 123,
131 N. E. 454, 17 A. L. R. 669; Tomkins v. Quaker Oats Co., (192-1) 239
Mass. 147, 131 N. E. 456.
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dors and the like to persons not in privity of contract with them,
unless the facts bring the case clearly within one of the well recognized exceptions to the old general rule"*4
An interesting group
of cases on this point may be called the soap cases. If a needle
is found in a cake of soap after the user's hand has been torn by
it, the maker of the soap is not liable,50 nor where an excess of
alkalye in the soap affects the skins of persons upon whom it is
used, a barber cannot recover for the loss of patronage resulting."1
The damage might be regarded as too remote in this case but the
court laid great stress on the want of privity of contract. On
the other hand recovery has been allowed against vendors of
livestock for property damage where plaintiffs not in privity are
able to show that the defendant knew of the defect.5 2 These
cases do represent the conscious or unconscious application of
principles not involved in the cases depending on the relation of
manufacturer to ultimate consumer and resting on negligence.
It already has been suggested that, given the other elements
of liability on the part of a manufacturer, it is immaterial whether
the damage is personal or otherwise. The writer has however
found one case which has clearly met and discussed this point,
holding that the nature of the damage is immaterial. This is the
case of Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co.,13 in which the plaintiff

had purchased a Ford touring car, second hand, from the original
retail purchaser who bought it of a dealer. The dealer himself
was not the mere agent of the Ford Motor Company, but had
purchased the car outright from the manufacturer. Due to defectively assembled brakebands and inferior material, the car got
49Pitman v. Lynn Gas & Electric Co. (1922) 241 Mass. 322, 135 N. E.
233; Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., (1907) 194 Mass. 341, 80 N. E.
482. But see Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., (1915) 220 Mass. 593,
108 N. E. 474.
50Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., (1909) 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157,
23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 876, but see contra, the case of Armstron-z Packing
Co. v. Clem, (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) 151 S. W. 576. Lye in soap.
Defendant held without plaintiff having shown that defendant knew of
excess of lye.
51
Slattery v. Colgate Co., (1903) 25 R. I. 220. 55 Atl. 639. 14 Am.
Neg. Rep. 467. But see Mazetti v. Armour & Co., (1913) 75 Wash.
622. 135 Pac. 633 in which restaurant keeper was allowed to recover of
packer for loss of patronage resulting from impurity in canned tongue
bought
of dealer.
52
Skinn v. Reuter, see note 32 supra.
53
See Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., (1915) 167 App. Div. 433, 153
N. Y. S. 131. Somewhat to the same effect in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75
Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633.
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out of control and went over a bank. The plaintiff, who was the
owner, was not injured but the car was. It was held that the
plaintiff could recover from the maker, for the damage to the
car. This case was decided in the appellate division of the New
York supreme court and in its opinion the court said:
"This question [submitted by the defendant] concedes the
proposition that a manufacturer in sending out an inherently
dangerous. machine would be liable to one suffering personal
injury but seems to draw a:distinction between the duties of the
manufacturer in reference to injuries to the machine itself. We
think there is no well founded ground for smch distinction."
The opinion in this case makes the following points:
1. A modern automobile properly constructed is not inherently dangerous.
2. When it is defective so as to make it unfit normally to
respond to the operations of careful driving it becomes inherently
unsafe and a menace to the public.
3. The appellant admits liability to the plaintiff for personal
injury.
4. The manufacturer's liability depends not upon the results
of the accident, but upon the fact that his failure properly to construct the car resulted in the- accident.
5. In such cases the negligence is based upon the failure to
perform a duty owed to all persons in whose presence the
machine is used.
Still we have no answer to this question: If the thing was
not dangerous to human life or health, even in its defective state,
but only to property and did in fact do such injury to property as
might be likely to result from such defect, will the manufacturer
then be liable to a person not in privity of contract with him?
Another case in which it is said that a manufacturer may
be liable for property damage resulting from a defective product
is that of Murphy v.Sioux Falls Serum Co." In this case the
plaintiff employed a veterinarian to immunize his hogs against
cholera. The veterinarian used for this purpose material manufactured and sold to the veterinarian by the defendant. The hogs
acquired another disease from which some of them died. The
defendant was sued- on the theory that the injury to the hogs
was due to impurities in the serum which got in as a result of
54(1921) 44 S. D. 421, 184 N. W. 252. Second Appeal (19-23) 47 S.D.
44, 195 N. W. 835.
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negligence in the process of manufacture. Judgment was given
for the plaintiff below; the supreme court held that the plaintiff
had stated a cause of action but sent the case back for a new
trial on other grounds; viz., as to error in the exclusion of certain
evidence tending to show that the cause of the loss was not defendant's negligence but the faulty technique of the veterinarian
in administering the serum.
Unfortunately the court in rendering this decision stated
none of its reasons for reaching the result it did. It seems doubtful- whether the question as to any distinction between personal
and property damage was brought to the court's attention. The
case was tried and decided in the court below, and was treated in
the appeal briefs, as one involving the Wintcrbottom v. Wright
and M1cPherson v. Buick Motor Co., principles. The court cites
no authorities on these points in its opinion. There is however
one thing in the record of this case which is of some interest in
connection with the present inquiry. The trial judge in his order
denying a new trial took occasion to include a memorandum of
his opinion on this question of law. He said:
"Confessedly one of the ingredients of this medicine was
poison. It is the conviction of the court in such case or where
the medicine or commodity is an explosive or something highly
dangerous to life or property, the law imposes a duty of care on
the druggist or manufacturer commensurate with the general
danger in such case, and, if from want of care anyone is injured.
whether it was the original purchaser or not, he can maintain an
action."
And again:
"It impresses the court that plaintiff . . . could have argued
that defendant did not show it was free from negligence as to
this consignment and, having manufactured it, defendant presumptively, and not the plaintiff, knew its contents. In fact it is
held the druggist or manufacturer is bound to know the properties when it vends a medicine."
It will be noted that this trial court makes no distinction
between things dangerous to human life or health, and those
dangerous merely to property. Now in any case the plaintiff
should be required to show when he sties the manufacturer of a
defective product that-if the damage resulted from its use-it
was being used for the purpose for which it was intended. Otherwise not even a person who was in privity of contract has any
cause of action. Following this line of thought, no one is going
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to say that if hog-cholera serum is being used for the purpose
for which it was intended it involves danger to human life or
health. The only exception, to the necessity that the thing shall
be used for the purpose for which it was intended, is the case of
the mislabelled thing and there it must be used for the purpose
for which its label indicated or suggested it might be used.
Hence, on its facts and in the absence of any limiting langoage
in the supreme court opinion, the case of Murphy v. Sioux Falls
Serum Co., may be regarded as indicating that where a "negligently defective product" likely to cause property damage only,
does in fact cause property damage the manufacturer is liable
tc. one not in privity of contract with him who suffers loss in consequence.
Query, would Judge Cardozo go this far? From*his general language, relative to taking the Buick Case out of the field of
contract and warranty and putting it in the law, one might fairly
suppose that he would. But it is to be remembered that the Buick
Case and also the Quackenbush Case did involve an agency,
which, in its defective state, was potentially dangerous to human
life. judge Cardozo dearly emphasized that circumstance in his
opinion and referred to it again in his Yale lectures ("The
Growth of the Law,") already referred to. The writer cannot
but regret that he did not in the process of reasoning through the
Buick Case, point the way for us in dealing with the last mentioned situation of articles not dangerous to humans and actually
causing only pfoperty damage. True, the law holds in the highest regard those interests which involve human life, but, if cases
of this sort do really rest on the modern conception of "negligence," is not the property interest of the plaintiff sufficient to
justify the courts in permitting him to recover for his losses
proximately caused by the defendant in this manner?

